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11 Id., Sec. 5.01.  The original of the Form 3115 must be
filed with:  Office of Associate Chief Counsel
(Domestic); Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
ATTN: CC:DOM:P&SI:6; Room 5112; P.O. Box
7604; Ben Franklin Station; Washington, DC 20044.
12 Rev. Proc. 96-31, supra note 5, Sec. 5.01(1).
13 Id., Sec. 5.01(2).
14 Id., Sec. 5.01(3).
15 Id., Sec. 5.04(3).
16 Id., Sec. 5.05.
17 Rev. Proc. 96-31, supra n. 5, Sec. 7.  The depreciation
adjustment to basis is the amount allowable, not the
amount claimed. Brock v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-
177 (calculation of gain on foreclosure sale of rental
property).
18 See I.R.C. § 167.
19 Rev. Proc. 96-31, supra n. 5, Sec. 7.02.
20 See I.R.C. § 168.
21 I.R.C. § 168(a).
22 I.R.C. § 168(g).  See Rev. Proc. 96-31, supra n. 5, Sec.
7.03.
23 Rev. Proc. 96-31, supra n. 5, Sec. 7.04.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS . The debtor, a ranch
partnership, purchased cattle from a dealer on installment,
with the debtor granting the dealer a purchase money
security interest in the cattle. The security interest was
later amended because of a change in the brand on the
cattle. The dealer filed the security interest with the
Secretary of State instead of the proper place in the county
recorder’s office. The debtor later borrowed funds from a
bank and granted the bank a security interest in all
livestock. The bank searched the state and county records
and discovered the dealer’s security interest at the state
office but not the county office. Although the bank could
have obtained a copy of the security interest from the
state, the bank did not ask for a copy. The dealer obtained
a court order to turn over 195 cows and 25 heifers within
90 days before the Chapter 12 bankruptcy filing. The
debtor-in-possession sought to avoid the dealer’s security
interest in the cattle as unperfected and to avoid the court
order transferring the cattle to the dealer. The court held
that the security interest was not perfected because it was
not filed with the county recorder; therefore, the debtor-in-
possession could avoid the security interest. The dealer
argued that the court-ordered transfer of the cattle was not
preferential because of the new value given for the order
in that the dealer had allowed a hearing to continue in
exchange for the transfer order. The court held that the
court-ordered transfer was an avoidable transfer because
the hearing delay was not sufficient new value for the
transfer. The bank sought to have its security interest
given first priority in the cattle after the avoidance. The
court held that, because the bank had knowledge of the
dealer’s security interest, even though improperly filed,
the bank could not assert a priority security interest;
therefore, the debtor-in-possession had a priority security
interest in the cattle by means of the avoidance of the
dealer’s security interest. In re Double J Cattle Co., 203
B.R. 484 (D. Wyo. 1995).
EXEMPTIONS
CASH. The debtor claimed cash on hand as exempt
tangible personal property under Ind. Code § 34-2-28-
1(a)(2). The trustee objected, arguing that money was an
intangible subject to exemption only under Ind. Code §
34-2-28-1(a)(3). The court reviewed Indiana law and held
that cash was tangible personal property when held by the
debtor and eligible for exemption as tangible property.
Levin v. Dare, 203 B.R. 137 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor had granted a second
mortgage to the FmHA (now FSA) on real property. The
FmHA’s lien was divided into a secured claim and
unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case, based on the fair
market value of the property at the confirmation of the
plan. After the plan payments were completed, the FmHA
objected to the payments on the unsecured claim and
received additional payments in settlement of that claim.
The debtor was granted a discharge and the case was
closed. The debtor later died and the debtor’s estate sold
the property for substantially more than the value used in
the bankruptcy case. The FmHA argued that it retained a
lien against the property for the portion of the unsecured
claim not paid in the bankruptcy case. The FmHA cited
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) in support of its
argument that its lien was not “stripped” as to the
unsecured portion. The court held that Dewsnup did not
apply to Chapter 12 cases where the “stripping” of liens
was allowed by Section 1222(b)(2); therefore, at the
discharge of the debtor, the FmHA lien was extinguished.
The appellate court affirmed, noting that the Chapter 12
plan specifically provided for extinguishment of the
FmHA lien upon payment of all plan secured and
unsecured claims. Harmon v. U.S., 101 F.3d 574 (8th
Cir. 1996), aff’g, 184 B.R. 352 (D. S.D. 1995).
PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for
payment of a secured claim owed to a Farm Credit Bank
over the life of the plan at 7.5 percent interest. The
original loan had an interest rate of 8.75 percent. The
Bankruptcy Court did not confirm the plan because the
interest rate was less than the prime rate plus 1.5 percent
for the risk factor, given the debtor’s poor repayment
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history. The appellate courts affirmed the Bankruptcy
Court decision. The court rejected the debtors’ argument
that the interest rate could not exceed the contract rate and
held that the rate was to equal the rate the bank would
charge for lending the same amount as would be received
from a foreclosure of the debt, i.e. a market rate of
interest. Koopmans v. Farm Credit Services, 102 F.3d
874 (7th Cir. 1996), aff’g, 196 B.R. 425 (N.D. Ind.
1996).
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for a trustee’s fee of 10 percent of the payments
to be made to the creditors. The trustee objected to the
plan, arguing that the fee was to be applied to the
payments made to the trustee, resulting in a 11.11 percent
charge against the payments to be made to the creditors.
The court held that the statutory fee of 10 percent was
unambiguous and was limited to 10 percent of the
property to be paid to the creditors. The court reasoned
that, because the statute assessed the fee against “the
payments made under the plan” and because only the
trustee makes the plan payments, the fee could not be
assessed to payments made to the trustee by the debtor. In
re Wallace, 102 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’g, 197 B.R.
82 (E.D. Mo. 1996), aff’g, 167 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. This case involved two
bankruptcy cases. In the first case, the debtor filed for
Chapter 13 and included federal income tax refunds in the
fund for payment of creditors, but after the case
commenced, the IRS refused to pay the refunds and
allowed an administrative offset in favor of the Bureau of
Child Support Enforcement. In the second case, the facts
were similar except the offset was to the U.S. Department
of Education. In both cases, the IRS was not a creditor and
did not receive notice of the bankruptcy filing. The court
held that the offsets violated the automatic stay but refused
to award damages because the violations were not willful
in that the IRS did not receive notice of the filing. In re
Lafanette, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,124 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1997).
CLAIMS. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for
100 percent payment of allowed secured claims. The IRS
filed a claim for taxes, listing a portion of the claim as
secured, a portion as priority unsecured and a portion as
general unsecured. The IRS had filed a tax lien against the
debtor’s property pre-petition which was junior to a
mortgage on the debtor’s residence. The debtor’s
residence was worth less than the total amount owed on
the mortgage and tax lien. Three years after confirmation
of the plan, the debtor moved to reduce the secured
portion of the IRS claim to the amount of the value of the
residence above the mortgage debt. The court held that the
modification of the IRS claim was allowed because the
plan provided for payment of allowed claims and a
secured claim was allowed only to the extent of the value
of the collateral. In re Strong, 203 B.R. 105 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had petitioned the Tax
Court to challenge a deficiency notice from the IRS which
included a penalty for fraud. The Tax Court case resulted
in a grant of summary judgment to the IRS because the
debtor failed to file answers to the IRS claims. The Tax
Court ruling included a specific finding of fraud by the
debtor in filing false W-E forms. The debtor then filed for
Chapter 7 and the IRS sought to have the deficiency
declared nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1). The
debtor argued that the Tax Court decision was not
applicable to the dischargeability of the tax claim because
the Bankruptcy Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
determining the tax claim. The court held that it did not
have exclusive jurisdiction over tax claims and that the
Tax Court ruling was entitled to res judicata as to the
element of fraud by the debtor; therefore, the tax claim
was not dischargeable. In re Palmer, 203 B.R. 460 (D.
Mont. 1996).
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  The debtors had a net
operating loss (NOL) for 1990. The debtors filed for
Chapter 7 in December 1991 and did not elect to close
their tax year effective with the bankruptcy filing. The
debtors received a discharge of millions of dollars of debt
in March 1992. The debtors filed their 1991 return on
April 9, 1993 and claimed the unused NOLs as a
deduction against the 1991 income. The debtors argued
that, because the bankruptcy estate did not use the NOLs,
the NOLs were returned to the debtors at the close of the
case. The court held that, upon the filing of the Chapter 7
case, the NOLs passed to the bankruptcy estate because
the debtors did not make the election to end their tax year
with the filing. The court also held that because the NOLs
were part of the bankruptcy estate, the discharge of
indebtedness received by the estate reduced the NOLs
before the tax attributes of the estate passed to the debtors
after discharge. Kahle v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-91.
REFUND. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 on January
12, 1996 and filed the debtor’s 1995 personal income tax
return on January 22, 1996. The IRS allowed the refund
but refused to pay it to the debtor and offset the refund
against the debtor’s income tax deficiency for earlier
years. The court held that the refund was a pre-petition
obligation of the IRS to the debtor and was eligible for the
setoff. In re Glenn, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,188
(E.D. Pa. 1997), rev’g, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,447 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
CONTRACTS
INFECTIOUS DISEASE. The plaintiff was a
supplier of breeding pigs and delivered breeder pigs to the
defendant under written contracts. The contracts had
provisions regarding losses from infectious diseases and
required the defendant to isolate all new shipments for 30-
60 days in order to receive credit for pigs which had
infectious diseases. The contracts limited damages to
replacement of pigs lost because of disease. The defendant
and plaintiff learned about the outbreak of Porcine
Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) during
their contractual relationship. The plaintiff performed tests
for the disease and found some pigs testing positively for
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PRRS. The defendant did not perform tests on delivered
pigs for PRRS until more than a year after the last
shipment from the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for the
purchase price of the delivered pigs and the defendant
counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of warranty,
negligence and fraud. The defendant sought damages for
infection of healthy pigs from PRRS in the pigs shipped
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the contracts
expressly limited damages to the loss of value of the pigs
delivered. The defendant claimed that the damage
limitation portion of the contracts was unconscionable.
The court held that the damage limitation provisions were
not unconscionable because the defendant was an
experienced businessperson and had sufficient knowledge
of PRRS and failed to take steps to test the pigs upon
delivery. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff
breached express warranties that the delivered pigs were
free of infectious diseases and were suitable for breeding
when the plaintiff knew from testing that some of its pigs
were infected with PRRS and that PRRS affected the
breeding ability of pigs. The court noted that the pigs were
shipped in compliance with federal and state inspection
laws and that the defendant failed to test the animals upon
delivery; therefore a question of fact remained as to
whether the delivered pigs were actually infected with
PRRS. The court also held that the defendant’s claims of
fraud were insufficient in that the defendant failed to show
that the contracts imposed any duty on the plaintiff to
advise the defendant as to the proper testing for PRRS. Pig
Imp. Co., Inc. v. Middle States Holding Co., 943 F.
Supp. 392 (D. Del. 1996).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adotped as final
regulations changing the classification of New Mexico
from a Class A to Class Free state. 62 Fed. Reg. 5907
(Feb. 10, 1997).
CONSERVATION. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations revising the CRP regulations, including the
consolidation of all CRP regulations in 7 C.F.R. Part 1410.
The new provisions include (1) inclusion of wetlands and
acreage enrolled in the Water Bank Program as eligible
CRP acres; (2) expansion of the conservation priority
areas to include CRP acres, the Wetlands Reserve
Program and the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program; (3) restriction of the total CRP acres in a state to
10 percent of the total crop land; (4) provisions for an
incentive of up to 25 percent of the costs of restoring
wetlands; and (5) provisions for incentives to enroll filter
strips, riparian buffers, field windbreaks, grass waterways,
and EPA acres designated as wellhead protection acres. 62
Fed. Reg. 7601 (Feb. 19, 1997).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations which include the cranberries endorsement in
the Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 5903 (Feb. 10, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the dry beans endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 6099 (Feb.
11, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the fresh plum endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 6134 (Feb.
11, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the ELS cotton endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 6703 (Feb.
13, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the onion endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 6739 (Feb.
13, 1997).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The plaintiff was a farmer
who grew basil in 1993 and arugula in 1994. In 1993, the
plaintiff suffered crop loses and applied for disaster
payments. The county committee made an initial
determination of crop yields and payment rate but later
modified the determination to lower substantially both
figures. In 1994, the plaintiff also suffered disaster losses
and applied for disaster benefits. Again the county
committee made an initial determination of yield and
payment rates but later substantially lowered both figures.
The plaintiff challenged the committee’s modifications as
not authorized by statute and as arbitrary and capricious.
The court held that the modification of yield and payment
rates was within the power of the county committee.
However, the court remanded the case to the CCC because
the county committee provided no factual basis on the
record for the initial determinations nor for the
modifications; therefore, the court could not determine
whether the initial rates or the modifications were
arbitrary. Guy v. Glickman, 945 F. Supp. 324 (D. D.C.
1996).
GRAIN STANDARDS. The Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration has adopted as
final regulations removing the voluntary U.S. grade
standards for Beans, Whole Dry Peas, Split Peas, and
Lentils from the Code of Federal Regulations. The
voluntary standards and all subsequent revisions or new
standards will be made available in a separate publication,
and will appear as notices in the Federal Register for
public comment. 62 Fed. Reg. 6705 (Feb. 13, 1997).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The
plaintiffs were poultry consumers who challenged
regulations promulgated under the Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. The plaintiffs
argued that the differences between the poultry regulations
and regulations promulgated under the Federal Meat
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., as to the
allowance of more than zero percent tolerance for process
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defects in poultry and the allowance of water washing
contaminated carcasses. Under the red meat regulations, a
zero tolerance for process defects was required and
contaminated carcasses had to be trimmed. The Secretary
argued that the regulations were enforcement decisions
which were unreviewable by the courts, under Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). The court held that the
regulations were interpretative of the underlying law and
were reviewable by the courts. The court remanded the
case for trial, holding that the two basic acts were
substantially similar enough to bring into question the
validity of issuing different standards for contamination of
poultry and red meat products. Kenney v. Glickman, 96
F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 1996).
W E T L A N D S . The plaintiff was a farmer who
participated in the federal price support and production
adjustment programs in 1988 and 1989. In 1980, the
plaintiff haddug two “dugouts” in the middle of a field. In
1989, the plaintiff filled in the holes. The ASCS (now
FSA) determined that the land around the dugouts was
wetland and that the plaintiff had filled in a portion of the
surrounding land and planted an agricultural crop on the
land in violation of the swampbuster provisions, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3801(a)(4)(A). The plaintiff generally attacked the
ASCS ruling as arbitrary and capricious but the court held
that the ruling was based on substantial evidence of soil
tests and aerial photographs. The court specifically ruled
that the filling in of the dugouts in 1989 was not a
continuation of the original digging of the dugouts in
1980; therefore, the conversion did not commence prior to
1985. Downer v. United States, 97 F.3d 999 (8th Cir.
1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer formed
a charitable remainder unitrust. The trust agreement
granted the taxpayer as co-trustee the power to change the
charitable beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the power to
change the charitable beneficiary did not disqualify the
trust for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9707027, Nov.
19, 1996.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s
spouse died before the decedent. The decedent’s spouse’s
will provided for passing of the estate to an intervivos
trust set up by the decedent’s predeceased spouse. Under
the trust agreement, the trust was then split into two
marital trusts and a family trust. One marital trust received
a reverse QTIP election and both marital trusts were QTIP.
At the death of the decedent, the children became vested
owners of the estate with one child disclaiming a portion
of the trust. The IRS ruled that, because the disclaimer
was filed more than nine months after the predeceased
spouse’s death, the disclaimer was ineffective for estate
tax purposes and gave rise to gift tax. Ltr.  Rul. 9707026,
Nov. 19, 1996.
The decedent owned a life insurance policy on the
decedent’s life and the surviving spouse was the
beneficiary of that policy. The surviving spouse was the
executor of the estate and was co-trustee of a marital trust
for the surviving spouse. In order to allow full funding of
the testamentary bequests, the surviving spouse disclaimed
all interest in the life insurance policy. The IRS ruled that
the disclaimer was effective and that the surviving
spouse’s powers as trustee and executor were sufficiently
restrained under state law that the spouse did not have a
general power of appointment over the disclaimed
property; therefore, the disclaimer was effective because
the surviving spouse had no power to direct passing of the
property. Ltr. Rul. 9707008, Nov. 12, 1996.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent had conveyed real
property to an Illinois Land Trust. The trust agreement
provided that the trustee, a bank, could not convey  or
otherwise deal with the property without the written
consent of the decedent. The trust agreement also provided
that the beneficiaries of the trust had only the power of
direction to deal with the title to the property, to manage
and control the property, and to collect any rent or
mortgage payments received for the property. The
decedent had conveyed beneficial interests in the trust to
heirs within three years before the decedent died.  The Tax
Court had held that the land trust created two retained
powers in the decedent. One power was as grantor to
direct the sale or conveyance of the property and the other
power was as a beneficial interest holder to collect income
and to control the property. The Tax Court had held that
the conveyances of the beneficial interests to the heirs
removed the decedent’s ability to control conveyance of
the property as to those interests because the decedent had
a fiduciary duty to protect those interests. The appellate
court agreed with the Tax Court’s characterization of the
interests and powers retained by the decedent but
disagreed that the decedent relinquished the decedent’s
power to convey the property as to the beneficial interests
conveyed. The appellate court held that the decedent’s
power as grantor to control the sale or conveyance of the
property continued after the conveyance of the beneficial
interests and that the decedent was under no fiduciary
duty, under Illinois law, to protect the beneficiaries’
interest in the trust. In other words, the decedent retained
the power to revoke the beneficial interests by conveying
the property free of the trust; therefore, the value of the
beneficial interests was included in the decedent’s gross
estate. Est. of Bowgren v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 60,257 (7th Cir. 1996).
INTEREST. The decedent’s estate consisted primarily
of farm real property. The estate requested and received a
one year extension to pay estate tax because the estate had
difficulty selling estate property to raise funds for payment
of the estate tax. The estate requested a second extension
which was pending at the time of this case. The IRS had
filed a notice of deficiency and the estate challenged the
amount of the deficiency in this case. The estate requested
the Tax Court to delay a ruling in the case so that the
interest accruing on the deficiency would be deductible.
I.R.C. § 6512(a) denies deductions of interest after a court
decision becomes final. The court withheld issuance of a
final order until either the extension expired or was denied
(including appeals of the denial) or the estate tax was paid
in full. Est. of Wetherington v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. No. 4
(1997).
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MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* At the
time Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3) was promulgated,
the position contained in the regulation was the subject of
litigation in a number of cases and had been rejected by
two circuit courts in Estate of Clayton v. Comm’r, 976
F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g 97 T.C. 327 (1991), and
Estate of Robertson v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir.
1994), rev'g 98 T.C. 678 (1992). Since that time, Estate of
Spencer v. Comm’r, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g
T.C. Memo. 1992-579, also rejecting the IRS position, has
been decided. Additionally, in Estate of Clack v. Comm’r,
106 T.C. 131 (1996), the Tax Court reversed the position it
had taken previously in Estate of Clayton, Estate of
Robertson, and Estate of Spencer. The IRS has issued a
temporary regulation which amends the regulations in
accordance with the circuit courts' decisions in Estate of
Clayton, Estate of Robertson, and Estate of Spencer, and
the Tax Court's decision in Estate of Clack. The
amendment adds Temp. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-
7T(d)(3)(ii), which states that an income interest (or life
estate) that is contingent upon the executor's election
under section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) will not be precluded, on
that basis, from qualification as a ``qualifying income
interest for life'' within the meaning of I.R.C. §
2056(b)(7)(B)(ii). In accordance with the addition of
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7T(d)(3)(ii), Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7T(h) Example 6(ii) and Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1T Example 8 were also added. 62
Fed. Reg. 7156 (Feb. 18, 1997).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].*
Certiorari to the U.S Supreme Court has been applied for
in the following case. The decedent died on December 15,
1995 owning farm property. The decedent’s estate
attempted to make a special use valuation election on the
estate’s timely filed estate tax return. However, the
executor failed to fill in the “yes” box after the question on
the form asking if a special use valuation was elected and
the return failed to include the recapture agreement of the
qualified heirs. The IRS notified the estate that the
election was incomplete and the estate supplied the
recapture agreement within 90 days after the IRS
notification. The IRS denied the election because the
initial return did not substantially comply with the election
requirements. The court held that the recapture agreement
was an essential element of the election and the estate
return did not substantially comply with the election;
therefore, the estate was not entitled, under I.R.C. §
2032A(d)(3) to perfect the election. The estate also argued
that Section 1421 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed
the perfection of the election because the original estate
tax return provided “substantially all the information” for
the election. The court held that the recapture agreement
was an essential part of the “information” required by
Section 1421 and the failure to provide the agreement
prevented the estate from perfecting the election after
notice by the IRS. Estate of Lucas v. United States, 96-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,247 (11th Cir. 1996).
VALUATION. The taxpayer established a 5-year
annuity trust which provided an annuity to the taxpayer. If
the taxpayer died before the end of the trust term, the
remaining annuities were to be paid to the surviving
spouse, unless the taxpayer revoked that interest. If the
taxpayer revoked the spouse’s interest, the spouse
predeceased the taxpayer, or the spouse died before the
end of the term, the remaining annuity payments were to
be paid to the taxpayer’s estate. The remainder interests
were held by the taxpayer’s descendants. The issues here
were the valuation of (1) the interest held by the surviving
spouse assuming the taxpayer died before the end of the
term and did not revoke the spouse’s interest and (2) the
value of the taxpayer’s estate to receive annuity payments
if the taxpayer died before the end of the term and revoked
the spouse’s interest. The IRS ruled that interest number
(1) was not a qualified interest because it was contingent
and interest number (2) was not a qualified interest
because the term was not fixed. Thus, the value of the
taxpayer’s annuity interest was not decreased by the value
of interests (1) and (2). Ltr. Rul. 9707001, Oct. 25, 1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS.
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer corporation
had claimed research and development expenditures over
several years but after an IRS audit, the expenditures were
disallowed and required to be capitalized. The IRS ruled
that the disallowance was an IRS-imposed accounting
method change which did not require the taxpayer to
obtain IRS consent. Ltr. Rul. 9707003, Oct. 31, 1996.
REORGANIZATIONS. A farm corporation was
owned by the members of two families.  When the
members of one family decided to curtail their
involvement in farming, the corporation was reorganized
as two corporations by transferring some of the assets to
the second corporation and exchanging stock in the new
corporation for the stock of the members of one family in
the old corporation. The IRS ruled that the reorganization
was eligible for tax-free treatment as a “Type D”
reorganization. Ltr. Rul. 9705024, Nov. 5, 1996.
CASUALTY LOSSES. S. 239 has been introduced to
include floods or other weather-related conditions as
casualties causing the sale of livestock under I.R.C. § 451
which currently allows the deferral of income from sales
of livestock only because of drought. The same
amendment would be made to I.R.C. § 1033 for purposes
of the involuntary conversion and replacement of property
sold because of casualties.
During a remodeling of the taxpayer’s home, the home
was damaged by high winds and rain. The taxpayers
presented estimates of the value of the damage but the
estimates did not include sufficient detail of the items
damaged or their value. In addition, although the
taxpayers presented invoices for repair work, the invoices
were insufficient to determine whether the work
performed was limited to repair of the wind and rain
damage. The court held that the casualty loss claimed by
the taxpayers was not allowed for failure to substantiate
the amount of the loss.  Oliver v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-84.
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CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The taxpayer owned
380 acres of rural property. In 1984, the taxpayer sold 48
acres to a development company which developed the
land into residential lots. The state then offered to
purchase the remaining acres and the taxpayer had the
property appraised at $12 million but sold the land to the
state for $6 million and claimed a $6 million charitable
deduction from the sale. The taxpayer’s value was reduced
by the court to $10 million based on the value of the
property as residential development property and $2
million of the charitable deduction was disallowed. Glick
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-65.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was employed full
time as a director of mental health clinics. The taxpayer
owned a rural property and purchased three horses to be
trained as jumpers. The court held that the taxpayer could
not deduct expenses in excess of income from the horse
breeding and training activity because (1) the taxpayer did
not seek expert advice on how to make the activity
profitable, (2) the taxpayer did not keep separate records
for the activity, (3) the taxpayer did not provide sufficient
efforts in the activity to prepare the horses for profit
generating activities, (4) the activity had only losses for
each year of operation, (5) the taxpayer had substantial
income from employment, and (6) the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate any reasonable expectation of appreciation in
the value of the horses. The taxpayer also purchased a bull
and four cows with calf. The cows produced calves each
year and the taxpayer raised the calves until they reached
market weight before selling the calves. The court also
held that the calf operation was not entered into with the
intent to make a profit but did not explain the various
factors for that decision.  Drummond v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1997-71.
INCOME AVERAGING. Senators Shelby, Grassley,
Cochran, Roberts, Abraham and Hutchinson have
introduced a bill, Senate 251, which allows taxpayers with
income from a farming business to elect to use two year
income averaging for the income from that business.
Farming income includes gain from the sale of property
(except land) regularly used in the farming business for a
substantial period before the sale.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.83 5.75 5.71 5.68
110% AFR 6.43 6.33 6.28 6.25
120% AFR 7.02 6.90 6.84 6.80
Mid-term
AFR 6.42 6.32 6.27 6.24
110% AFR 7.07 6.95 6.89 6.85
120% AFR 7.72 7.58 7.51 7.46
Long-term
AFR 6.86 6.75 6.69 6.66
110% AFR 7.57 7.43 7.36 7.32
120% AFR 8.26 8.10 8.02 7.97
RETURNS. The IRS has issued a revised revenue
procedure concerning obtaining copies of filed tax returns.
The fee for a copy of a return has been increased to
$23.00, submitted in advance with Form 4506, Request for
Copy of Transcript of Tax From. Return transcripts and
account transcripts are available for no charge from the
IRS. Rev. Proc. 97-11, I.R.B. 1997-_, __.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BANKS. The IRS has issued guidance for banks,
under I.R.C. § 581, to change their method of accounting
for bad debts from the reserve method, I.R.C. §585, to the
specific charge-off method, I.R.C. § 166, so that the bank
may make the S corporation election. Rev. Proc. 97-18,
I.R.B. 1997-_, __.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff was a part-time farmer
who grew silage corn for feed. Most of the corn was
grown for feed for the plaintiff’s own livestock, but the
plaintiff occasionally sold some of the crop to neighbors.
The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to have the
defendant, an herbicide manufacturer and distributor, to
spray the corn fields for weed prevention. The defendant
purchased a herbicide from another manufacturer and
applied it to the plaintiff’s fields. The herbicide was
ineffective against crabgrass and the plaintiff experienced
a loss of yield for two crop years. The plaintiff sued in
negligence, strict liability and negligent misrepresentation
and sought damages for the loss of the value of the
reduced yield of the corn. The court held that the plaintiff
was an ordinary consumer in that the plaintiff was a part-
time farmer and sold very little of the corn to third parties.
The court also held that the plaintiff’s loss was an
economic loss in that the herbicide was damaged by the
alleged negligent acts and not the corn. The court
reviewed Vermont law to hold that economic losses were
allowed in actions for negligence and strict liability. The
court also allowed the claim for negligent
misrepresentation because the plaintiff presented evidence
that employees of the herbicide manufacturer supplied
information about the effectiveness of the herbicide
against crabgrass. Mainline Tractor & Equipment Co.
v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Vt. 1996).
STATE TAXATION
VALUATION. The taxpayers owned and operated a
dairy farm on 148 acres within a city limits. The property
had extensive frontage on a road and on a lake. The city
valued the property for property tax purposes as
residential development property and the taxpayers
appealed that valuation. The taxpayers argued that the
valuation of the property in residential parcels was
incorrect because the entire property was used as a dairy
farm. The court held that the valuation statute required
valuation of property at its highest and best actual or
potential use; therefore the valuation based on residential
development was allowed under the statute. The court also
ruled that the difficulties of obtaining development rights
were not sufficient to invalidate the valuation. Scott
Const. v. City of Newport, 683 A.2d 382 (Vt. 1996).
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http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
Check out our internet site for information about:
• Agricultural Law Manual, by Neil E. Harl, a
comprehensive, annotated looseleaf deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law, a comprehensive
annotated college textbook, by Roger A. McEowen and
Neil E. Harl.
• Seminar in Paradise, “Farm Estate and Business
Planning,” by Neil E. Harl in Hawaii, January 5-9, 1998.
• Direct internet links to free legal resources on the
internet.
• Direct email link to the Agricultural Law Press.
We welcome any suggestions for improving our web
site.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to
keep the Manual current with the latest developments.
After the first free update, additional updates will be billed
at $100 per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
ISSUE INDEX
Bankruptcy
General
Avoidable liens 34
Exemptions
  Cash 34
Chapter 12
Discharge 34
Trustee fee 35
Federal taxation
Automatic stay 35
Claims 35
Discharge 35
Net operating losses 35
Refund 35
Contracts
Infectious disease 35
Federal Agricultural Programs
Burcellosis 36
Conservation 36
Crop insurance 36
Disaster payments 36
Grain standards 36
Meat and poultry inspection 36
Wetlands 37
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Charitable deduction 37
Disclaimers 37
Gross estate 37
Interest 37
Marital deduction 37
Special use valuation 38
Valuation 38
Federal Income Taxation
C Corporations
Accounting method 38
Reorganization 38
Charitable deduction 38
Hobby losses  39
Income averaging 39
Returns 39
Safe harbor interest rates
March 1997  39
 S corporations
Banks 39
Products Liability
Herbicide 39
State Taxation
Valuation 39
